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Abstract. This paper studies finitely repeated games with semi-standard
monitoring played in pure strategies. In these games, each player’s action
set is endowed with a partition, and the equivalence classes of the actions
played are publicly observed. We characterize the limit set of equilibrium
payoffs as the duration of the game increases.
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1 Introduction
The main result of the theory of repeated games is the Folk Theorem which
states that when players perfectly observe their opponents’ actions and are
patient enough, every feasible and individually rational payoff vector can
be sustained by an equilibrium. This was first proved by Aumann and
Shapley [1] and Rubinstein [17] for infinitely repeated undiscounted games.
The result was then extended to discounted games by Sorin [20] for Nash
∗The authors thank Joseph Abdou and Olivier Gossner for helpful discussions and
comments
†CES, Universite´ Paris 1 Panthe´on-Sorbonne, CNRS, UMR 8174, 106-112 Bd de
l’Hoˆpital, Paris Cedex 13, France. p contou@yahoo.fr
‡HEC Paris, Department of Economics and Decision Sciences,78351 Jouy-en-Josas
Cedex, France. tomala@hec.fr
1
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.73
equilibria, and by Fudenberg and Maskin [6] for subgame perfect equilibria.
Benoˆıt and Krishna [2], [3] proved Folk Theorems for finitely repeated games
with pure strategies and Gossner [9] extended the results of [2] to mixed
strategies.
The assumption of perfect observation is not realistic in many applied
settings and a large literature is devoted to repeated games with imperfect
monitoring were players observe imperfect signals depending on the actions
played. Seminal results for discounted repeated games are in Fudenberg et
al. [5], [7] and Fudenberg and Levine [4], who characterize subgame perfect
equilibrium payoffs of repeated games with public monitoring through dy-
namic programming methods. While the literature on discounted repeated
games with private monitoring is profuse, no general characterization is
known to date, see the book of Mailath and Samuelson [14] for a survey.
On another hand, undiscounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring
were first studied by Lehrer [10], [11], [12], who obtained characterizations
of equilibrium payoffs for two-player games and for n-player games with
semi-standard monitoring. Tomala [21] obtained a characterization for re-
peated games with public monitoring and pure strategies, and Renault and
Tomala [16] characterized the set of communication equilibrium payoffs for
any repeated game with imperfect monitoring.
Suprisingly little attention has been paid to finitely repeated games with
imperfect monitoring, notable exceptions being the works of Sekiguchi [18],
Mailath et al. [13], and Renault at al. [15]. However, these results are quite
specific and to the best of our knowledge, no Folk-Theorem-like result is
known for a reasonably wide class of games with imperfect monitoring.
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We combine the approaches of Benoˆıt and Krishna [2], [3], and of Lehrer
[11] and consider finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring.
These are finitely repeated games where each player’s set of actions is
equipped with an equivalence relation and at each stage of the game the
equivalence classes of the actions played are publicly observed. Our aim
is to study the asymptotics of the equilibrium payoff sets in relation with
the results of Lehrer [11]. Considering the infinitely repeated undiscounted
game, Lehrer characterized the set of equilibrium payoffs as the set of in-
dividually rational payoffs which are feasible by actions profiles that offer
no unilateral deviation which is both profitable and undetectable. Let us
call E this set of payoffs which is determined by the stage game and the
equivalence relations on the action sets.
Firstly, following Benoˆıt and Krishna [3], we assume that for each player,
there exists a strictly individually rational Nash equilibrium payoff in the
one-shot game. Under this assumption, we show that the set of Nash equi-
librium payoffs ET of the T -fold repeated game converges to E as T goes
to infinity, thus generalizing the result of Benoˆıt and Krishna [3] to the
semi-standard setup.
Secondly, following Benoˆıt and Krishna [2], we study subgame perfect
equilibria and assume that for each player, there exist two distinct Nash
equilibrium payoffs in the one-shot game and thatE has a non-empty interior
(conditions C1 and C2 thereafter). It turns out that the set of subgame
perfect equilibrium payoffs E∗T of the T -fold repeated game does not converge
to E. The reason is the following. To obtain a subgame perfect equilibrium,
one needs to control for optimality during punishment phases, i.e. we must
3
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.73
provide incentives to implement punishments. Due to imperfect monitoring,
only action profiles that offer no undetectable and profitable deviation can
be played by a subgame perfect equilibrium. The room for punishment is
thus more narrow and the individual rationality constraints are tighter. We
introduce the relevant notion of minmax level that takes into account the
undetectable and profitable deviations, and we let E∗ be the set of payoff
in E which are individually rational with respect to those minmax levels.
Under conditions C1 and C2, we prove that E∗T converges to E∗ as T goes
to infinity, thereby providing the generalization of the result of Benoˆıt and
Krishna [2] to the semi-standard setup. It is worthwhile to note that our
results apply also to discounted games (finitely or infinitely repeated): the
set of discounted subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs is a subset of E∗ and
we show convergence of this set to E∗ as the discount factor goes to one. Like
Benoˆıt and Krishna [2], our results hold for pure strategies. The extension
to mixed strategies, as in Gossner [9], is left as an open problem (the issue
is commented in Section 5).
To conclude the introduction, let us compare our results to relevant
works on finitely repeated games. Firstly, there is a line of literature (Smith
[19], Gonzales-Diaz [8]) on finitely repeated games with perfect monitoring
whose aim is to dispense with conditions on the stage game (like conditions
C1 and C2). Similarly, Wen [22] studies discounted games without full
dimensionality assumptions, and introduces the notion of effective minmax
level. The focus of our paper is different. We do not depart from the
usual and simple sufficient conditions of Benoˆıt and Krishna [2], [3] on the
stage game. Rather, we study the impact of observation on the equilibrium
4
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payoffs of the repeated game. In particular, the minmax we introduce is not
comparable with Wen’s effective minmax. Our notion is driven by purely
informational considerations.
Secondly, as mentioned above, the literature on finitely repeated games
with imperfect monitoring is scarce. Most relevant to the present paper is
the work of Sekiguchi [18] who studies the finite repetition of a stage game
which has a single equilibrium. The signals have a product structure akin to
semi-standard monitoring: for each player i, a stochastic signal depending
on player i’s action only, is publicly announced. Distributions of signals
are assumed to have common support. Under these assumptions, Sekiguchi
[18] shows that the finitely repeated game has a unique equilibrium payoff.
We differ from Sekiguchi’s model in two aspects. First, following Benoˆıt
and Krishna [2], we assume that the stage game has multiple equilibria.
Second, we assume pure strategies, and consequently the signals do not
have common support (otherwise, they are trivial). Another related paper
is Mailath et al. [13] which shows on a specific finitely repeated game with
public monitoring, that equilibria in public strategies do not exhaust all
equilibria of the game. This result is specific to mixed strategies, as any pure
strategy is fully equivalent to a pure public strategy. Finally, Renault et al.
[15] prove a Folk Theorem for finitely repeated minority games with public
signals. Note that the monitoring structure of this game is not semi-standard
and that specific properties of the minority games are used extensively in
Renault et al. [15].
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In
Section 3, we give necessary conditions satisfied by equilibrium payoffs. The
5
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main theorem is in Section 4. Section 5 offers extensions and concluding
remarks. Section 6 is devoted to the proof of the main theorem.
2 The model
Let G = (N, (Xi)i∈N , (gi)i∈N ) be a normal form game where N = {1, . . . , n}
is a finite set of players, for each i ∈ N , Xi denotes the set of actions of
player i and gi : ×i∈NXi → R is the payoff function of player i. The set
of action profiles is denoted X = ×i∈NXi and g : X → Rn denotes the
vector payoff function (gi)i∈N . All action sets are assumed to be topo-
logical compact spaces and g is assumed to be continuous. We denote
M = maxi∈N,x∈X |gi(x)|. Throughout the paper, we use the conventional
notation −i to denote the set of players j 6= i and use it for indexing
x−i = (xj)j 6=i and for products of sets X−i = ×j 6=iXi.
Each action set Xi is endowed with a partition X¯i. For xi in Xi, we
denote x¯i the cell of the partition containing xi. The partition induces an
equivalence relation ∼i on Xi: xi ∼i yi if x¯i = y¯i. We denote X¯ = ×i∈NX¯i.
As particular case, games with finite action sets enter this setup. Another
class of games of interest are finite games in mixed strategies with observable
distributions of signals. For each player i, there is an underlying finite set
of actions Ai endowed with a partition. We let Xi be the set of probability
distributions over Ai. A distribution xi over actions defines a distribution
x¯i over equivalence classes of actions: x¯i(a¯i) =
∑
ai∈a¯i xi(ai). The partition
of Ai induces an equivalence relation over Xi defined by: xi ∼i yi ⇔ x¯i = y¯i.
In this model, players choose mixed actions and if player i chooses xi, the
6
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distribution x¯i is publicly observed.
We turn now to the description of the repeated game. For each integer
T ≥ 1, the T -fold repeated game GT unfolds as follows. At each stage
t ≤ T , players select actions simultaneously and if x = (xi)i ∈ X is the
action profile chosen, the profile of equivalence classes x¯ = (x¯i)i is publicly
announced. The game ends after stage T and if (xt)
T
t=1 is the sequence
of actions profiles, player i gets the payoff 1T
∑T
t=1 gi(xt). This describes a
repeated game with semi-standard monitoring.
Now, we describe the strategies in the repeated game. For all player i
and t ≤ T , let Hi,t = (Xi × X¯)t−1 be the set of histories at stage t of player
i (Hi,1 is a singleton) and Hi,T =
⋃
1≤t≤T Hi,t be the set of all histories of
player i in GT . The set of public histories at stage t is Hp,t = X¯
t−1 and
Hp,T =
⋃
1≤t≤T Hp,t is the set of all public histories in GT . A pure strategy
for player i is a mapping σi : Hi,T → Xi. Let Σi,T be the set of pure
strategies of player i in GT and ΣT = ×i∈NΣi,T be the set of profiles of
pure strategies. A profile σ = (σi)i∈N induces a unique sequence of action
profiles denoted (xt(σ))1≤t≤T where xt(σ) = (xi,t(σ))i∈N and xi,t(σ) is the
action played by player i at stage t.
Given a strategy profile σ, the average payoff of player i is γi,T (σ) =
1
T
∑T
t=1 gi(xt(σ)). The repeated game GT is now given by the normal form
(N, (Σi,T )i∈N , (γi,T )i∈N ).
Definition 2.1 A strategy profile σ ∈ ΣT is a Nash equilibrium of GT if for
every player i and for all τi ∈ Σi,T , γi,T (τi, σ−i) ≤ γi,T (σ).
We let ET ⊆ Rn be the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of GT . That is,
7
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u ∈ ET if there exists a Nash equilibrium σ of GT such that ui = γi,T (σ) for
each player i.
The main focus of this paper is on subgame perfect equilibria. To define
this concept properly, we first introduce public strategies: a strategy of
player i is public if it only depends on public signals, that is on profiles of
equivalence classes of actions. In other words, player i’s strategy depends
on her own past actions only through the equivalence classes. This concept
is widely used in repeated games (see e.g. Fudenberg and Levine [4] and
Fudenberg et al. [5]) and may impose restrictions on the resulting equilibria
(see Mailath et al. [13]). However, restricting to public strategies is without
loss of generality in games with pure strategies. The argument is simple and
well known (see e.g. Tomala [21]). Consider a pure public strategy of player
i. The action played at the first stage is encoded in the strategy. Given
a public history, player i can use the strategy to compute the actions she
played in the past. The recall of her own past actions is thus implicit.
More precisely, let σi ∈ Σi,T be a pure strategy of player i and hp ∈ Hp,T
be a public history. Then, σi induces a unique sequence of actions compatible
with hp, and therefore there is a unique private history hi := h˜i(σi, hp)
compatible with hp and σi. Thus, the next action σi(h˜i(σi, hp)) depends
on the public history only. This construction defines a public strategy σ′i
which is equivalent to σi, i.e. for all σ−i and all stages t, xi,t(σi, σ−i) =
xi,t(σ
′
i, σ−i). In the remainder of the paper, we identify a pure strategy with
the equivalent public strategy. This allows to give a sound definition of
subgame perfect equilibria. In repeated games with imperfect monitoring,
there is no proper subgame since actions are not publicly observed. However,
8
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when all players rely on public information only, we may safely define the
subgame that follows a public history. This leads to the concept of perfect
public equilibrium (Fudenberg and Levine [4] and Fudenberg et al. [5])
which we simply call subgame perfect equilibrium in the present context.
Given a strategy σi of player i and a public history h, we denote by σi[h]
the continuation strategy following h. That is, σi[h](h
′) = σi(hh′) for each
public history h′ (hh′ denotes the concatenated history h followed by h′).
We denote σ[h] the profile (σi[h])i.
Definition 2.2 A strategy profile σ ∈ ΣT is a subgame perfect equilibrium
of GT if for all t < T and h ∈ Hp,t, σ[h] is a Nash equilibrium of GT−t.
We let E∗T ⊆ Rn be the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of GT .
That is, u ∈ E∗T if there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium σ of GT such
that ui = γi,T (σ) for each player i. In the sequel, we characterize the limit
(in the Haussdorff topology) of E∗T as T goes to infinity. Note that, in our
pure strategy setup, E∗T is non empty for some T if and only if the game G
admits a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. We maintain this assumption
throughout the paper.
3 Necessary conditions
The usual necessary conditions for equilibrium payoffs of repeated games
are feasibility and individual rationality. We give the counterpart of each
condition in our model. First, we revisit feasibility.
9
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3.1 Feasibility
Following Lehrer [11], we argue that the actions profiles played at equilib-
rium must not offer undetectable and profitable deviations to the players.
The intuition is as follows. Assume that player i has two equivalent actions
xi ∼i yi, and that player i receives a higher payoff by playing xi than by
playing yi, given the actions y−i of the other players. It is then impossible to
have player i choosing yi against y−i at an equilibrium. If so, player i would
deviate to xi to increase her stage payoff. Since x¯i = y¯i, the deviation goes
unnoticed and therefore has no impact on future payoffs. The deviation is
thus profitable in the repeated game.
For each player i ∈ N , let Di be the set actions profiles x = (xi)i∈N such
that if player i deviates to an action in x¯i, her payoff does not increase.
Definition 3.1 For each player i ∈ N ,
Di =
{
(xi, x−i) ∈ Xi ×X−i : gi(xi, x−i) = max
yi∼ixi
gi(yi, x−i)
}
We let D :=
⋂
i∈N Di. An action profile in D is such that there exists
no unilateral deviation which is both profitable and undetectable. Remark
that a Nash equilibrium of G belongs to D. Indeed, if x ∈ X is a Nash
equilibrium of G, then for each i, xi is a best response of player i to x−i.
Then xi maximizes player i’s payoff also on the set of actions which are
equivalent to xi. As a consequence, D is a non-empty compact subset of X
(recall that g is continuous).
10
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Examples 3.2
1. Monitoring is perfect when xi ∼i yi ⇒ xi = yi. It follows directly that
Di = D = X.
2. Monitoring is trivial when xi ∼i yi for all xi, yi ∈ Xi. In this case,
Di is the set of action profiles (xi, x−i) such that xi is a best response
against x−i. It follows that D is the set of Nash equilibria of G.
3. D needs not be a product set of actions. Consider the following nu-
merical two-player example. The payoff matrix is
y1 y2 y3 y4
x1 3, 4 1, 3 3, 2 1, 1
x2 −1, 1 0, 0 4, 2 3, 0
x3 2, 1 −1, 2 5, 0 1,−1
x4 −1, 1 4, 0 −1, 1 0, 0
The partitions are X¯1 = {{x1, x2}, {x3, x4}} and X¯2 = {{y1, y2}, {y3, y4}}.
One can easily check thatD1 = {(x1, y1), (x1, y2), (x2, y3), (x2, y4), (x3, y1),
(x3, y3), (x3, y4), (x4, y2)} andD2 = {(x1, y1), (x1, y3), (x2, y1), (x2, y3), (x3, y2),
(x3, y3), (x4, y1), (x4, y3)}. It follows thatD = {(x1, y1), (x2, y3), (x3, y3)}.
The next lemma shows that a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game
prescribes actions profiles in D on the equilibrium path. Further, a subgame
perfect equilibrium prescribes actions profiles in D after all histories.
Lemma 3.3
• If σ is a Nash equilibrium of GT , then for all t ≤ T , xt(σ) ∈ D.
11
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• If σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium of GT , then for each public history
h, σ(h) ∈ D.
Proof. Let us prove the second point. Let σ be a subgame perfect equi-
librium of GT and assume by contradiction that there is a public his-
tory h of length t such that σ(h) 6∈ D. Without loss of generality, as-
sume σ(h) 6∈ D1. Let τ1 be a strategy of player 1 such that for all h′ ∈
Hp,T \ {h}, τ1(h′) = σ1(h′) and τ1(h) is an action such that τ¯1(h) = σ¯1(h)
and g1(τ1(h), σ−1(h)) > g1(σ(h)). The public signal after h is the same
under (τ1, σ−1) and under (σ1, σ−1). Thus, the sequence of action profiles
induced by (τ1, σ−1) after stage t + 1 coincides with the one induced by
(σ1, σ−1). It follows that γ1,T−t(τ1[h], σ−1[h]) > γ1,T−t(σ[h]), contradicting
the fact that σ[h] is a Nash equilibrium of GT−t.
The first point follows by the same argument applied on the equilibrium
path. ¤
As a consequence, an equilibrium payoff is a convex combination of points
in g(D).
Corollary 3.4 For each T , E∗T ⊆ ET ⊆ co g(D)
3.2 Individual rationality
In this section, we revisit individual rationality and we start be recalling the
usual notion. We denote the minmax level of player i by
vi = min
x−i∈X−i
max
xi∈Xi
gi(xi, x−i)
12
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and we let IR be the set of payoff vectors u ∈ Rn such that for all i ∈ N ,
ui ≥ vi. As usual in repeated games, any equilibrium payoff is individually
rational: ET ⊆ IR for each T . The proof is standard, for any strategy σ−i
of players −i, playing a best-reply to σ−i(h) after each history h, yields a
payoff no less than vi to player i.
However, with semi-standard monitoring, we get tighter constraints for
subgame perfect equilibria. The intuition is the following. From Lemma
3.3, a subgame perfect equilibrium prescribes action profiles in D after each
history. It follows that if the minmax above cannot be achieved by a joint
action in D, then it is not possible to punish player i to vi whithin a subgame
perfect equilibrium. We introduce the relevant notion of minmax level. For
each i ∈ N , let D∗−i be the projection of D on X−i, i.e.,
D∗−i = {x−i ∈ X−i : ∃xi ∈ Xi, (xi, x−i) ∈ D}.
Definition 3.5 For each player i in N , the semi-standard minmax level of
player i is,
v∗i = min
x−i∈D∗−i
max
xi∈Xi
gi(xi, x−i)
Let x∗−i(i) ∈ D∗−i be an action profile for players −i which achieves
the minimum above. Against this profile, player i’s payoff is at most v∗i ,
no matter which action she plays. Let x∗i (i) ∈ Xi be such that x∗(i) :=
(x∗−i(i), x
∗
i (i)) ∈ D. If x∗(i) is played, then there is no player who can
profitably deviate without being detected, and player i’s payoff is at most
v∗i . We denote IR
∗ the set of payoffs which are individually rational with
respect to the semi-standard minmax levels.
13
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Lemma 3.6 For each T , E∗T ⊆ IR∗.
Proof. Let σ be a subgame perfect equilibrium of GT and τi be the strat-
egy of player i which plays a stage-best reply after each history. That is,
∀h ∈ Hp,T , τi(h) ∈ argmaxxi∈Xigi(xi, σ−i(h)). By Lemma 3.3, σ−i(h) ∈
D∗−i, for each h ∈ Hp,T . It follows:
gi(τi(h), σ−i(h)) ≥ min
x−i∈D∗−i
max
xi∈Xi
gi(xi, x−i) = v∗i
and thus γi,T (τi, σ−i) ≥ v∗i . Since σ is an equilibrium of GT , γi,T (σi, σ−i) ≥
γi,T (τi, σ−i) ≥ v∗i . ¤
We provide now an example where the semi-standard minmax level dif-
fers from the usual one.
Example 3.7 Consider a two-player game where the sets of actions are
X1 = {a1, b1, c1} and X2 = {a2, b2, c2} for players 1 and 2 respectively. The
partitions are X¯1 = {{a1, b1}, {c1}} and X¯2 = {{a1, b2}, {c2}}. The payoff
matrix is:
a2 b2 c2
a1 3, 4 6, 0 2,−1
b1 −1, 2 5, 1 0, 1
c1 2, 4 3, 0 3, 3
The action b1 of player 1 is strictly dominated by a1 and a¯1 = b¯1. It follows
that D1 = {(x1, x2) : x1 6= b1}. Similarly, D2 = {(x1, x2) : x2 6= b2}.
14
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Therefore, D = {a1, c1} × {a2, c2}. It follows that
v∗2 = min
x1 6=b1
max
x2∈X2
g2(x1, x2) = 4
while v2 = 2.
For this example, it is worthwile to note that the minmax levels (v2 and
v∗2) are the same if the game is played in mixed strategies with observable
distributions of signals. Indeed, in this model, D is the set of mixed action
profiles such that the dominated actions b1 of player 1 and b2 of player 2 are
played with probability 0. •
4 The main results
We examine now the convergence of the set of equilibrium payoffs to the set
of individually rational payoffs that are feasible and robust to undetectable
unilateral deviations. Denote E = co g(D) ∩ IR and E∗ = co g(D) ∩ IR∗.
Lehrer [11] proved thatE is the set of equilibrium payoffs of the undiscounted
infinitely repeated game. On another hand, for perfect monitoring, Benoˆıt
and Krishna [3] proved that, under some condition on the stage game, ET
converges to E as T goes to infinity. This result easily extends to semi-
standard monitoring.
Theorem 4.1 Assume that for each player i ∈ N , there exists a Nash
equilibrium ei of G1 such that gi(e
i) > vi. Then ET converges to E in
the Hausdorff topology as T goes to infinity.
15
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Proof. The proof is a straightforward extension of the construction of
Benoˆıt and Krishna [3] and we just provide an outline. Given a payoff
vector u ∈ E, there exists a finite sequence of actions that induce an average
payoff vector ε-close to u. The strategy recommends the players to follow
the sequence cyclically for finitely many cycles. At the end of this phase,
if no deviation is detected, then each static equilibrium ei is played during
Ri consecutive stages at the end of play. Therefore, in case of no detectable
deviation, the play ends up in a sequence of one-shot Nash equilibria during
R =
∑n
i=1Ri consecutive stages. If at some stage t, some player i deviates
from the main path in a detectable way, then her opponents play a minmax
strategy against player i from stage t to the end of the game. Following
Benoˆıt and Krishna [3], we can adjust the lengths Ri and the number of
cycles in such a way that this strategy profile forms a Nash equilibrium of
GT provided T is large enough. ¤
Now, we extend the result of Benoˆıt and Krishna [2] for subgame perfect
equilibria, to repeated games with semi-standard monitoring. Benoˆıt and
Krishna [2] introduced the following conditions:
Condition C 1 For each player i ∈ N , there exist two Nash equilibria of
the static game ei and f i such that gi(e
i) > gi(f
i).
Condition C 2 dim(co g(D)) = n
Benoˆıt and Krishna [2] proved that in games with perfect monitoring, E∗T
converges to E as T goes to infinity, under these conditions. It follows that,
under conditions C1 and C2, ET and E∗T have the same limit for games with
16
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perfect monitoring. Our next result shows that this is not the case for games
with semi-standard monitoring.
Theorem 4.2 Under conditions C1 and C2, E∗T converges in the Hausdorff
topology to E∗ as T goes to infinity. I.e., for all ε > 0, there exists T0 ∈ N
such that for all T ≥ T0 and u ∈ E∗, there exists v ∈ E∗T , ‖u− v‖ ≤ ε.
Examples 4.3 1. In the case of perfect monitoring, we have for each
player i, Di = X, thus D = X and D
∗
−i = X−i. It follows that
E∗ = co g(X)∩ IR. Theorem 4.2 is then the Folk Theorem of Benoˆıt
and Krishna [2] when specialized to perfect monitoring.
2. In the case of trivial information, D is the set of Nash equilibrium
payoffs of G and E∗ is the convex hull of the associated set of payoff
vectors. Clearly E∗T converges to E∗, it is enough to approximate a
convex combination of Nash payoffs by playing static equilibria with
the right proportions.
The proof of Theorem 4.2 follows Gossner [9]. The idea is the following.
We define a normal path as a finite sequence of actions profiles that yield an
average payoff vector close to the target payoff. When a unilateral deviation
is detected, the play enters a punishment phase. Punishers are rewarded at
late stages of the game. Not applying punishments entails losing the terminal
reward. This deters detectable deviations, both from the normal path and
from the punishment phase. The strategy only uses actions profiles inD and
thus undetectable deviations are not profitable. The detailed construction
is in the Appendix.
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5 Extensions and open issues
5.1 Discounted games
Our main results extend easily to discounted games. Let δ ∈ [0, 1) be a
discount factor. The T -fold discounted game GT,δ is described as the game
GT except for the payoff function which is given by:
γT,δ(σ) =
T∑
t=1
1− δ
1− δT δ
t−1g(xt(σ)).
The discounted game G∞,δ is described similarly but is repeated infinitely
many times. The payoff function is:
γ∞,δ(σ) =
∞∑
t=1
(1− δ)δt−1g(xt(σ)).
We let E∗T,δ (resp. E∗∞,δ) be the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of
the game GT,δ (resp. G∞,δ). The counterpart of Theorem 4.2 for discounted
game is the following.
Theorem 5.1 • For each T, δ, E∗T,δ ⊆ E∗∞,δ ⊆ E∗.
• Under conditions C1 and C2, E∗T,δ (resp. E∗∞,δ) converges in the Haus-
dorff topology to E∗ as T →∞ and δ → 1 (resp. δ → 1).
Proof. To prove the first point, first note that Lemma 3.3 extends to
discounted games. That is, if σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium of GT,δ
(resp. G∞,δ), then for each history h, σ(h) ∈ D. The proof is exactly the
same. The inclusion in E∗ follows as in Lemma 3.6. To see the inclusion
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E∗T,δ ⊆ E∗∞,δ, consider a subgame perfect equilibrium σ of GT,δ and repeat it
periodically every T stages (past history is forgotten at the beginning of each
T -period). The resulting strategy is clearly a subgame perfect equilibrium
of G∞,δ and the overall discounted payoff is γT,δ(σ).
To prove the second point, it is thus enough to prove that E∗T,δ converges
to E∗ as T → ∞ and δ → 1. One can see from the proof of Theorem 4.2
that any detectable deviation yields a payoff strictly less than the equilibrium
payoff for a suitable choice of the parameters. These equilibrium constraints
are thus satisfied in GT,δ as well, provided that δ is close enough to 1. ¤
Regarding the convergence of E∗∞,δ to E∗ as δ → 1, a stronger result can
be obtained. Namely, Condition C1 can be dispensed with. To show this,
one may adapt the construction of Fudenberg and Maskin [6] to our setup.
We use only action profiles in D (on and off the equilibrium path), so that
deviations can be assumed to be detectable. The construction then adapts
easily.
Note that Fudenberg et al. [7] provide a characterization of limδ→1 E∗∞,δ
for games with public monitoring, using linear programming methods. Our
result provides an alternative characterization which allows a constructive
approach to the equilibrium strategies.
5.2 Other signalling structures
Let f : X → S be a function mapping the set of actions profiles to a set of
signals. The associated repeated game with public monitoring is such that
f(x) is publicly observed when x is played. The semi-standard monitoring
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case is such that f(x) = (x¯i)i. A natural generalization is the following.
Definition 5.2 The mapping f : X → S is rectangular if for every s ∈ S,
the inverse image f−1(s) = {x ∈ X : f(x) = s} is a product set ×iXi(s)
where Xi(s) is a subset of Xi.
Our results extend naturally to this case. Let Di be the set of action profiles
x such that, gi(xi, x−i) = maxyi∈Xi(f(x)) gi(yi, x−i), and D = ∩iDi. The
definition of the modified minmax v∗i then follows. The main arguments for
adapting the proofs are the following. Clearly, if σ is a subgame perfect
equilibrium, σ(h) ∈ D for each h. The inclusion of equilibrium payoffs in
E∗ follows. To adapt the constructions of the equilibrium strategies, it is
enough to remark that when a deviation is detected, the deviating player
is identified. To see this, assume by contradiction that there exists x ∈ X,
y1 ∈ X1 and y2 ∈ X2 such that,
t := f(y1, x−1) = f(y2, x−2) 6= f(x)
This implies that (y1, x2, x−12) ∈ X1(t)×X2(t)×X−12(t) and (x1, y2, x−12) ∈
X1(t)×X2(t)×X−12(t). But then, (x1, x2, x−12) ∈ X1(t)×X2(t)×X−12(t)
which contradicts f(x) 6= t.
More generally, the results extend whenever the signalling function al-
lows to ascribe any detectable unilateral deviation to a single player. With-
out this latter assumption on signals, charactezing the limit of E∗T is an open
problem (see Fudenberg et al. [7] and Tomala [21] for characterizations of
equilibrium payoffs in infinitely repeated games with public monitoring).
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5.3 Mixed strategies
Following Benoˆıt and Krishna [2], we have restricted the analysis to pure
strategies. Consider a finitely repeated game with semi-standard monitor-
ing, finite action spaces and mixed strategies. Assume first that distributions
of signals are observable and denote E∗m the corresponding limit equilibrium
payoffs set (i.e. co g(D)∩IR∗). Then E∗T converges to E∗m (under conditions
C1 and C2) from Theorem 4.2. Assume now that only realized signals are
observable and let E∗m,T be the corresponding set of (mixed strategies) equi-
librium payoffs. It is easy to show that E∗m,T ⊆ E∗m and a reasonable guess
is that convergence still holds (under conditions C1 and C2).
Gossner [9] extends the Folk Theorem of Benoˆıt and Krishna [2] to
finitely repeated games with perfect monitoring and mixed strategies where
only realized actions are observed. The idea is the following. The normal
path defines pure actions that approximate the target payoff. Punishment
phases require the use of mixed actions. Statistical tests are performed to
check the empirical frequency of actions for each player. Players are re-
warded at late stages of the game if they pass the test. The key idea of
Gossner’s proof is to avoid the explicit construction of the strategies. The
statistical test and the rewarding schemes are designed so that each player
has a strong incentive to pass the test with high probability and such that
passing the test implies that the average payoff during the punishment phase
is close to the minmax level. Gossner then argues that a subgame perfect
equilibrium of the game defined by the rewarding schemes approximates the
target payoff.
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This approach does not work in our setup. We can use Gossner’s con-
struction to force the players to induce a prescribed empirical frequencies of
signals. However, it is not possible to control for the actions played, within
a given equivalence class. In particular, two mixed action profiles may yield
the same distibution over signals and different payoff vectors. As a conse-
quence, a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game defined by the statistical
tests and the rewarding schemes, may pass the test with high probability
and yield a payoff far away from the target payoff. An open issue is thus to
prove convergence of E∗m,T to E∗m when only realized signals are observable.
6 Appendix: Proof of the main theorem
The proof adapts the method of Gossner [9] to semi-standard observation.
We first prove an analog of Theorem 4.2 for repeated games with terminal
payoffs.
A repeated game with terminal payoffs is a T -fold repeated game such
that, at the end of the play, each player i receives a history-dependent re-
ward. Given a mapping term = (termi)i : Hp,T → Rn, GT (term) is the game
with strategy sets (Σi,T )i and payoff functions:
θi,T (σ) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
gi(xt(σ)) +
1
T
termi((xt(σ)1≤t≤T )
That is, players choose actions at stages t ≤ T and receive the average
payoff plus the terminal payoff. We let E∗T (term) be the set of subgame
perfect equilibrium payoffs of GT (term).
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In the sequel, we focus on terminal payoffs that take the three values
−W, 0,W with W > 0. We let Term(W ) be the set of mappings from Hp,T
to {−W, 0,W}n and E∗T (W ) = ∪term∈Term(W )E∗T (term) be the union of the
corresponding sets of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs.
The next proposition is the analog of Theorem 4.2 for repeated games
with terminal payoffs and is the main step of the proof. We assume that
E∗ has a non-empty interior. Note that this holds under conditions C1 and
C2. Indeed, any Nash equilibrium of G is in E∗ and it follows from C1 and
C2 that the convex combination 12N
∑
i∈N (g(e
i)+ g(f i)) is in the interior of
E∗.
Proposition 6.1 For all ε > 0 and u ∈ int (E∗), there exist T0 ∈ N and
W0 ∈ R+ such that for all T ≥ T0 and W ≥ W0, there exists v ∈ E∗T (W)
with ‖u− v‖ ≤ ε (int (.) denotes the topological interior).
Proof. Let us choose ε > 0 and u ∈ int (E∗). Without loss of generality,
we assume that u is a convex combination of points in g(D) with rational
coefficients (otherwise, u can be arbitrarily approximated by such convex
combinations). We write u =
∑M
m=1
αm
α · g(zm) with zm ∈ D, αm positive
integers and α =
∑
m αm. Note that u is the average payoff vector along a
sequence of α action profiles where zm is played αm times.
Let us fix an integer K > 1, a positive real number W , and P = kPα
where kP is a positive integer such that 1 < kP < K. We let T = Kα be
the length of the game. We call normal path the sequence of actions profiles
(yt)t=1,...,T such that yt = zm if t = m mod(α). That is, along the normal
path, z1 is played α1 times, . . . , zM is played αM times, and this is repeated
23
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.73
K times cyclically. We define a strategy profile σ∗ as follows.
• The play starts in the normal path: y1 is played at stage 1.
• If the play is on the normal path at stage t, then yt is played. If the
public signal is y¯t, the play remains on the normal path at stage t+1.
Otherwise a deviation is detected, i.e. there exists a player i who plays
at stage t an action xi,t such that x¯i,t 6= y¯i,t.
• If a deviation of player i from the normal path is detected at stage
t < T − P , the play switches to the punishment phase of player i (if
there are several such players, we choose one arbitrarily).
• During the punishment phase of player i, the action profile (x∗−i(i), x∗i (i))
is played for P stages. Then, the play switches back to the normal
path.
• If a deviation from the normal path is detected at stage t ≥ T − P ,
the play remains on the normal path at stage t+ 1.
• After any other possible history, a fixed Nash equilibrium of G is
played.
The terminal payoff function is defined as follows.
• If the history follows the main path until stage T , then each player
gets 0 as terminal payoff. Otherwise, a deviation is detected and we
consider the last deviation detected along the history.
• If the last deviation is detected at some early stage t < T −P , consider
the punishment phase that follows and let i be the player punished in
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this phase. An effective punisher is a player j 6= i who played an action
xj such that x¯j = x¯
∗
j (i) during the punishment phase of player i. If
player j 6= i is an effective punisher then her terminal payoff is W .
Otherwise, her terminal payoff is 0.
• If a deviation is detected at some late stage t ≥ T −P , then all players
get −W as terminal payoff.
Now, we show that σ∗ is a subgame perfect equilibrium of GT (term) for
suitable choice of the parameters K,W,P . The one-shot deviation principle
applies: it is enough to check that there is no profitable unilateral deviation
that deviates only once from the equilibrium strategies. Firstly, if all players
abide by this strategy profile, then the average payoff is u. Secondly, by
construction, σ∗(h) ∈ D for each history h. It follows that a deviation that
does not change the public signals is not profitable. Thus, we only need to
check that there is no profitable and detectable deviation.
Early deviation from the normal path. Assume that player i deviates from
σ∗i at stage t < T − P by playing an action xi,t such that x¯i,t 6= y¯i,t. Player
i may increase her stage payoff at stage t. However, she is punished for
P stages instead of getting the target payoff ui. Overall the deviation is
not profitable if the punishment phase is long enough. Observe that the
terminal payoff of player i does not depend on her deviation. Let Ui be the
total payoff of player i from stage t + P + 1 to stage T , and let termi be
player i’s terminal payoff. The deviation is not profitable if:
M + Pv∗i + Ui + termi ≤ −M + Pui + Ui + termi
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This condition is satisfied if P ≥ P0 := maxi∈N 2M
ui − v∗i
.
Late deviation from the normal path. Assume that player i deviates from σ∗i
at stage t ≥ T −P . By construction of the strategies, player i may increase
her stage payoff until the end of the game. However, she induces the bad
terminal payoff −W . The deviation is not profitable if:
PM −W ≤ −PM
This condition is satisfied if W ≥W0 := 2PM .
Deviation from a punishment phase. Consider a unilateral detectable devi-
ation by player j from player i’s punishment phase (j 6= i). Player j may
increase her stage payoffs during the punishment phase, but she loses the
reward W . Denote Uj the total payoff of player j from the end of player i’s
punishment phase to stage T . The deviation is not profitable if:
PM + Uj + 0 ≤ −PM + Uj +W
This condition is satisfied if W ≥W0.
After any other history, only Nash equilibria of the game G are played,
and therefore no deviation is profitable. The strategy profile σ∗ is thus a
subgame perfect equilibrium of GT (term) if T = Kα, P ≥ P0 and W ≥W0.
If T is not a multiple of α, we complete the definition of σ∗ by playing a
fixed Nash equilibrium of G at the last T mod(α) stages of the game, irre-
spective of the history. For each T , we have thus constructed a subgame per-
fect equilibrium of GT (term), and a corresponding payoff θT (σ
∗) ∈ E∗T (W ).
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Provided that T mod(α) is small with respect to T (i.e. K is large), we have
‖θT (σ∗)− u‖ ≤ ε. ¤
Next, we show that the parameters of the above strategy can be chosen
“uniformly” with respect to the target payoff.
Corollary 6.2 For all ε > 0, there exist T0 ∈ N and W0 ∈ R+ such that
for all T ≥ T0, W ≥W0 and u ∈ E∗, there exists v ∈ E∗T (W ), ‖u− v‖ ≤ ε.
Proof. Let ε > 0 and u ∈ E∗. From Proposition 6.1, there exist T0
and W0 such that for all T ≥ T0 and W ≥ W0, there exists u∗ ∈ E∗T (W )
such that ‖u − u∗‖ ≤ ε. Since E∗ is compact, it can be covered by finitely
many balls: E∗ ⊆ ⋃Ll=1B(rl, ε2) where rl ∈ E∗ and B(rl, ε2) denotes the
ball with center rl and radius
ε
2 . For each l ∈ {1, . . . , L}, there exist T l0
and W l0 satisfying Propostion 6.1 for the vector rl. It is enough to consider
T ≥ T0 := maxl∈{1,...,L} T l0 and W ≥W0 := maxl∈{1,...,L}W l0. ¤
The next lemmas 6.3 and 6.4 adapt respectively lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 in
Gossner [9] and establish the link between E∗T (W ) and E∗T . The idea consists
in using the last stages of the game to simulate the terminal payoffs.
Lemma 6.3 Under conditions C1 and C2, there exists T1 ∈ N such that
dim(co E∗T1) = n.
Proof. The proof is almost the same as in Gosser [9]. Under Condition
C2, there exist action profiles x0, . . . , xn ∈ D such that dim(co {g(x1) −
g(x0), . . . , g(xn)− g(x0)}) = n.
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For each m = 1, . . . , n, we define a strategy profile σm as follows: at
stage t = 1, play xm. If x¯m is publicly observed, then the Nash equilibrium
e1 is played for Q consecutive stages, e2 for Q consecutive stages, . . . , and
en for Q consecutive stages. If player i deviates in a detectable way at stage
t = 1, then f i is played instead of ei (if there are several such players i,
one is chosen arbitrarily). For Q large enough, σm is a subgame perfect
equilibrium of GnQ+1. An undetectable deviation of player i at stage t = 1
is not profitable. If player i deviates in a detectable way at stage t = 1,
she gets at most M + Qgi(f
i) ≤ −M + Qgi(ei) for Q large enough, since
gi(e
i) > gi(f
i).
The payoff induced by σm is (g(xm) +Qg(e
1) + · · ·+Qg(en))/(nQ+ 1)
and is in E∗nQ+1 for Q large enough. It follows that dim(co E∗nQ+1) = n. ¤
As a consequence, for T1 ≥ nQ+1, the set of subgame perfect equilibrium
payoffs E∗T1 is rich enough to generate any terminal payoff, up to a fixed
translation in the payoff space. Precisely,
Lemma 6.4 Under conditions C1 and C2, there exists ρ0 > 0 such that for
all W > 0, there exist T2 ∈ N and U ∈ Rn,
∀r ∈ {−W, 0,W}n, ∃v ∈ E∗T2 , ‖r + U − T2v‖ ≤ ρ0
The formal proof is exactly the same as in Gossner [9] and is there-
fore omitted. The idea is the following. For each k, repeating k times an
equilibrium of GT1 , defines an equilibrium of GkT1 . More precisely, letting
TE∗T be the set of subgame perfect equilibrium total payoffs of GT , one has
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k · T1E∗T1 ⊆ kT1E∗kT1 . Since T1E∗T1 contains an open ball, for each W > 0,
there exists an integer k and a vector U ∈ Rn such that {−U} + kT1E∗kT1
contains {−W, 0,W}n. Note that ρ0 only depends on the game G and on
T1. We fix T1 and ρ0 from now on.
We may now complete the proof of Theorem 4.2.
Proof. Fix ε > 0. From Corollary 6.2, there exists T0 ∈ N and W0 ∈ R+
such that for all T ≥ T0, W ≥W0 and u ∈ E∗, there exists v ∈ E∗T (W ) such
that ‖u−v‖ ≤ ε. Fix a terminal payoff function term and a subgame perfect
equilibrium σ∗ of GT (term) such that v = θT (σ∗), as constructed in the proof
of Proposition 6.1. Lemma 6.4 gives T2 ∈ N and U ∈ Rn such that for all h ∈
Hp,T , there exists v(h) ∈ E∗T2 such that ‖term(h) + U − T2v(h)‖ ≤ ρ0. Since
adding the constant vector U to the terminal payoff does not change the
equilibrium constraints, σ∗ is a subgame perfect equilibrium of GT (term+U)
and we may assume w.l.o.g. U = 0. Define then term′(h) = T2v(h).
It is easy to check that, if W ≥ W0 + 2ρ0, then σ∗ is a subgame perfect
equilibrium of GT (term
′). The terminal payoff is used to deter deviations
from punishment phases and late deviations. Following a punishment phase
of player i, the terminal payoff term′ of player j is betweenW−ρ0 andW+ρ0
if she was an effective punisher, and is between −ρ0 and ρ0 otherwise. This
is enough to provide incentives to confirm with the punishment phase. The
same reasoning holds for late deviations.
Finally, we define a strategy profile σ∗∗ of GT+T2 as follows. The profile
σ∗ is played until stage T . Then if h is the sequence of actions played up to
stage T , a subgame perfect equilibrium of GT2 with payoff v(h) is played.
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From the construction, σ∗∗ is a subgame perfect equilibrium of GT+T2 . The
induced payoff is close to v and thus close to u. Indeed, let h∗ be the history
induced by σ∗ at stage T . By construction, term(h∗) = 0, so v = γT (σ∗)
and w := γT+T2(σ
∗∗) = TT+T2γT (σ
∗) + T2T+T2 v(h
∗). It follows,
‖v − w‖ ≤
∥∥∥∥γT (σ∗) T2T + T2
∥∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥∥ T2T + T2 v(h∗)
∥∥∥∥
≤ T2
T + T2
M +
1
T + T2
(ρ0 + ‖U‖)
which is arbitrarily small for T large enough. ¤
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